A Richman game is a combinatorial game in which, rather than alternating moves, the two players bid for the privilege of making the next move. The theory of such games is a hybrid between the classical theory of games von Neumann, Morgenstern, Aumann, . . . ] and the combinatorial theory of games Berlekamp, Conway, Guy, . . . ]. We expand upon our previous work by considering games with in nitely many positions, and several variants including the Poorman variant in which the high bidder pays the bank (rather than the other player). The algorithmic complexity of our procedure for computing optimal moves is found to be polynomial in several important cases.
What's in a Game?
There are several traditions within game theory, and two in particular are largely disjoint in the published literature.
One of these traditions is now sometimes referred to as matrix game theory or classical game theory and is the subject of the famous von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) treatise In many such games (such as Rock-Paper-Scissors, see Figure 1 ), two players make simultaneous moves and a payment is made from one player to the other depending on the chosen moves. Optimal strategies often involve randomness and concealment of information.
The other game theory is the combinatorial theory of the popular book Winning Ways (Berlekamp et al. 1982) , with origins in the work of Sprague (1936) and Grundy (1939) , and largely expanded upon by Conway (1976) . In a combinatorial game (such as Nim, see Figure 1 ), two players move alternately and there is no hidden information. We may assume that each move consists of sliding a token from one vertex to another along an arc in a directed graph. A player who cannot move loses. If the underlying graph is nite and acyclic, then one of the players has a deterministic strategy that guarantees that player the win. If the underlying graph is in nite or contains cycles, then there is also the possibility that both players might have deterministic strategies that guarantee that they will never lose. (See Fraenkel (1994) for an exhaustive bibliography of research in combinatorial game theory.)
We do not mean to imply that these are the only two branches of the theory of games, or that they has been no interaction between them. (In particular, there P P P P P P P P q @ @ @ R ? ? ? ) P P P P P P P P q @ @ @ R ? ?
v b v r Figure 2 : World Series or Quincunx Graph is a well-developed theory of stochastic games as described in Condon (1989) .) Our work should be seen as lying somewhere between these two traditions, drawing on both for inspiration.
Am I Blue?
The spinner game is a simple stochastic game played by two players (Mr. Blue and Ms. Red). There is an underlying combinatorial game in which a token rests on a vertex of some directed graph. There are two special vertices, denoted by v b and v r . (See, e.g., Figure 2 .) Blue's goal is to bring the token to v b and Red's goal is to bring the token to v r . At each turn, a spinner divided into two equal sectors (one red and one blue) is used to determine which player has the right to make a move. Half of the time Blue is allowed to move, and half of the time Red is allowed to move. The game is a draw if neither distinguished vertex is ever reached.
It is clear that in a general position, neither player can force a win. However, the players might hope to adopt a strategy that maximizes their probability of winning.
If the underlying graph is in nite or contains cycles, then there is the possibility of a draw. Are there certain trade-o s to be made between draws and wins? For example, are there certain \risky" moves that increase the probability of a win at the expense of also increasing the probability of a loss? In other words, is the solution dependent on the relative value of a draw versus a win for each player?
If I were a Richman Now consider the following game introduced by David Ross Richman in the mid-1980s. Each of the two players (Mr. Blue and Ms. Red) has some money.
As before, Blue's goal is to bring the token to v b on some directed graph and Red's goal is to bring the token to v r . Instead of taking turns or randomly determining who moves next, the two players repeatedly bid for the right to make the next move. Each player secretly writes on a card a nonnegative real number no larger than the number of dollars he or she has; the two cards are then revealed simultaneously. Whoever bids higher pays the amount of the winning bid to the opponent and moves the token from the vertex it currently occupies along an arc of the directed graph to a successor vertex. Should the two bids be equal, the players alternate making moves with Ms. Red being allowed to move on the rst occurrence of equal bids.
The game ends when one player moves the token to one of the distinguished vertices. The sole objective of each player is to have the game end with the token on his or her vertex. (At the end of the game, money loses all value.)
One might expect subtle psychological factors (blu ng, etc.) and mixed Nash equilibrium to be relevant to the formulation of strategies in Richman and spinner games. Surprisingly, this is not the case, for there exist optimal deterministic strategies for each player. Thus the precise manner in which the bidding is conducted becomes entirely irrelevant. Moreover, there are no tradeo s to be made in these games, since we describe a strategy which simultaneously maximizes one's probability of winning and minimizes one's probability of losing. For these reasons, our work has only a distant connection to the substantial body of literature on the theory of auctions, as surveyed for example by Wilson (1992) .
In fact, Richman and spinner games are closely related. The probability r(v) of Red winning a spinner game from a given position v, assuming optimal play from both players, is exactly the critical fraction of the total money supply that Blue needs to exceed in order to avoid a loss in a Richman game, again assuming optimal play from both players. Moreover, the probability R(v) of Red avoiding a loss in a Richman game from a given position v is exactly the critical fraction R(v) of the total money supply that Blue needs to exceed in order to force a win.
In the case of a nite graph, Lazarus et al. (1996) showed that the critical fractions r(v) and R(v) are equal, and we called this quantity the Richman cost of the vertex v. Thus, draws occur in a nite spinner game only with probability zero. Moreover, draws can only occur in the nite Richman game when the money is divided in a ratio of exactly R(v) to 1 ? R(v). In that case, optimal play results in repeated tie bids, and the fate of the Richman game is the same as the fate of the underlying combinatorial game. (The game could be a draw only if the graph has cycles.)
Stay tuned for more details
In Section 2, we review the properties of the Richman cost function of a directed graph. In particular, we relate its de nition to that of a harmonic function. In Section 3, we examine a \Poorman's" variant of the Richman game, and prove some analogous results. In Section 4, we discuss various issues related to the complexity of the calculation of R(v). The theorems of Lazarus et al. (1996) are limited to the case of nite directed graphs; in Section 5 we extend their results to the case of in nite directed graphs. Here the critical fractions r(v) and R (v) are not necessarily identical, so there is a non-trivial Richman interval in which neither player can force a win in the Richman game, and a positive probability that neither player win in the spinner game.
Several new variants of Richman/Poorman games are studied in Section 6. Surprisingly several of our results carry over to many variants. For example, the Marksman variant where one player pays in U. S. dollars and the other in deutsche marks is the Richman analogue of a spinner game played with a biased dial in which the red and blue portions of the dial do not both measure 180 degrees. On the other hand, some variants, such as Thief where both the high and the low bidder pay their bids to the bank, seem very di cult to analyze, and optimal play often dictates the use of mixed (non-deterministic) strategies.
For completeness, several results from Lazarus et al. (1996) are mentioned below. However, unless speci cally noted, all results here are new.
Richman Costs
Throughout this paper, D denotes a directed graph (V; E) with a distinguished blue vertex v b and a distinguished red vertex v r . All other vertices are considered to be colored black. We assume that from every vertex there is either a path to v r or a path to v b . We assume further that every vertex has a nite number of successors. (Occasionally, we explicitly make the additional assumption that D itself has a nite number of vertices.)
These conditions guarantee that all black vertices have successors. Thus, the game can only terminate at v b or v r with a win for one of the two players. On the other hand, it is possible for a game to go on forever if the graph contains a cycle. If a play of the game does not terminate (that is, if the players are committed to strategies that jointly do not result in the game ever ending), then the situation is said to be a \draw".
In this section, we summarize results from Lazarus et al. (1996) concerning the optimal strategy in the Richman game in the case that D is nite. Since in Richman games money is paid only back and forth between the two players, the total money supply remains xed throughout a game. It is convenient to normalize by assuming the total money supply is equal to one dollar. We assume that money is in nitely divisible.
Proofs have been omitted since they may be found in Lazarus et al. (1996) and in any case are similar to and simpler than the analogous proofs for the Poorman variant (Section 3). 
Note that Richman costs are a curious sort of variant on harmonic functions on Markov chains (Woess, 1994) are precisely the edges that would be chosen under optimal play, which involves Blue (respectively, Red) moving to the successor of the current vertex whose Richman cost is smallest (respectively, largest). If the graph contains cycles, then the above scheme for making bids does maintain the existence of a winning strategy, but it does not necessarily force a win! To illustrate the problem, consider the graph G in Proof: Theorems 1, 2, and 3.
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Theorem 2 and Corollary 4 do not cover the critical case where Blue has exactly R(v) dollars. In the critical case, with both players using optimal strategy, the Richman game reduces to the usual notion of a combinatorial game because of the way tied bids are resolved. Note, however, that in all other cases, the deterministic strategy outlined above works even if the player with the winning strategy concedes all ties and reveals his intended bid and intended move before the bidding. Now let us consider spinner games. Suppose the right to move the token is decided on each turn by the toss of a fair coin. Then induction on t shows that the probability that Red can win from the position v in at most t moves is equal to R(v; t), as de ned in the previous section. Taking t to in nity, we see that R(v) is equal to the probability that Red can force a win against optimal play by Blue. That is to say, if both players play optimally, R(v) is the chance that
Red wins. The uniqueness of the Richman cost function in the nite case tells us that 1 ? R(v) must be the chance that Blue wins. The probability of a draw is therefore zero.
If we further stipulate that the moves themselves must be random, in the sense that the player whose turn it is to move must choose uniformly at random from among the nitely many legal options, then we do not really have a gamelike situation anymore; rather, we are performing a random walk on a directed graph with two absorbing vertices, and we are trying to determine the respective probabilities of absorption at these two vertices. In this case, the relevant probability function is just the harmonic function on the directed graph D or, more properly speaking, the harmonic function for the associated Markov chain (see Figure 3 and Woess, 1994).
Don't run away
Consider the directed graph depicted in Figure 5 whose Richman cost function is to the vertex u, which is simultaneously farther from his goal v b and closer to his opponent's goal v r . His alternative is to move to the vertex w, which is closer to his goal and farther from his opponent's. This illustrates that the optimal strategy in Richman games does not respect the usual distance function on graphs.
Poorman Costs
When the third author rst heard about Richman games, he had a slight misunderstanding concerning the rules. He thought that the higher bidder was to pay the bank instead of the lower bidder, so that the money would never be seen again.
The main lines of the above theory are still valid even in this \Poorman" variant. However, the winning strategy is governed by a di erent sort of cost function.
Existence
Given 0 x y 1, de ne the Poorman's average of x and y to be avg P (x; y) = y 1 ? x + y : Note that avg P (x; y) y since 1 ?x+y 1. Also, x?avg P (x; y) = (y ?x)(1? A simple induction shows that P(v; t + 1) P(v; t) for all v and all t 0. Therefore, P(v; t) is weakly decreasing and bounded below by zero as t ! 1, hence convergent. It is also evident that the function P(v) = lim 
Game-theoretic interpretation
The Poorman cost function we have de ned does indeed govern the winning strategy.
Theorem 7 Suppose Blue and Red play the Poorman game on the directed graph D with the token initially located at vertex v. If Blue's share of the total money supply exceeds P(v) = lim t!1 P(v; t), then he has a winning strategy. Moreover, his victory requires at most t moves if his share of the money supply exceeds P(v; t).
Proof: It su ces to prove the result concerning P(v; t). Suppose Theorem 8 There is a unique Poorman cost function P(v) for a nite directed graph D. Thus, if Blue's share of the current total money supply is less (respectively, greater) than P(v), then Red (respectively, Blue) has a winning strategy.
Proof: Let P be any Poorman cost function, for example the one given by Suppose Blue has x dollars and Red has y dollars. We show that Blue can force a win if x=(x+y) > P(v) and that Red can force a win if x=(x+y) < P(v). Clearly, only one function P(v) can have this property. In fact, it su ces to prove that Blue can force a win if x=(x + y) > P(v), since Red may imagine that she is Blue playing on the graph D 0 . She can force a win in D whenever x=(x + y) < P(v) by imitating the strategy that Blue would use to win on D 0 were x=(x + y) > 1 ? P(v) , that is x=(x + y) < P(v).
In our proof, we use some of the techniques used in the proof of Theorem 7, where we showed that the Poorman cost function given by P(v) = lim t!1 P(v; t) has a certain game theoretic interpretation. There we showed that Blue can force a win whenever his fraction of the money supply exceeds P(v). In this proof, we prove that any Poorman cost function P(v) on a nite directed graph has this same property.
De ne Blue's surplus to be = x ? (P (v)y)=(1 ? P(v)): Suppose that x=(x + y) > P(v). It then follows that x > P(v)y=(1 ? P(v)), which shows that is positive.
Imagine that Blue puts dollars in a slush fund under his mattress and keeps x 0 = x ? in his wallet. We show that the x 0 dollars in his wallet are enough for Blue to stave o a loss inde nitely, while the dollars in his slush fund, if strategically used, allow Blue to win the Poorman game. Below, Blue's fraction of the money supply is calculated by dividing the contents x 0 of his wallet by the sum x 0 +y of his wallet and Red's money supply. (In other words, we ignore Blue's slush fund.)
Blue can clearly win the game if he ever is allowed to make n = jV (D)j moves in succession. De ne
The winning strategy we describe for Blue is to bid slightly more than (v) dollars when the token is at vertex v. One can think of the (v) dollars as an \ordinary expense" while the extra amount is Blue's \investment" paid out of his slush fund. Blue cleverly picks a di erent investment on each move with the motivation that he will make a net pro t within the slush fund in every sequence of bids that terminate with a successful bid by Red. Every time Red wins an auction, Blue reassesses his net worth and discovers that he can pay a dividend to his slush fund, increasing his surplus. The percentage growth of the slush fund is bounded away from zero, and hence the slush fund increases at least geometrically with the number of times Red wins the right to move.
Since there is a limit (namely, x) to how big the slush fund can grow and Blue can clearly win the game if he is ever allowed to make n = jV (D)j moves in succession, it follows that Blue will eventually win.
Suppose Blue bids (v) + when the token is at vertex v. Red actually has to pay at least dollars more than that, so Blue can transfer a dividend of at least P(w)=(1 ? P(w)) dollars from his wallet to his slush fund and still maintain in his wallet a fraction of the money supply greater than the Poorman cost at the vertex w. This implies that we cannot have P(w) = 1. Consequently, Red cannot win on this move.
We show that Blue, as long as he keeps winning the right to move, can pick an increasing sequence 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n of consecutive investments with the following properties:
1. He has enough in the slush fund to pay out all of the investments, and 2. Whenever Red decides to stop this sequence of moves by outbidding him, the dividend that Blue transfers to his slush fund on that move outweighs all of the investments he has made up to that point.
Let m be the smallest nonzero value taken by the function P(w)=(1?P(w)).
Let r = 1 + (2=m) and de ne 1 = 2 =m(r n ? 1) and i = 1 r i?1 .
To see that Blue has enough money in his slush fund to pay all of the investments, note that In contrast to Richman games, there does not seem to be any simple interpretation of Poorman costs as probabilities in any sort of spinner game. , one can simply step through these choices until the linear feasibility problem has a solution. Unfortunately, the number of such choices grows exponentially with respect to n, so such an approach is not computationally e cient.
Taking it easy
The following results show that in certain cases, it is simple to calculate Richman costs. For example, the following Proposition along with Theorem 12 show that at both extremes of \cyclicity" (namely, acyclic graphs and undirected graphs As an example, consider for example the graph in Figure 6 whose vertices are \scores" in the game of tennis. The successors of each vertex indicate the two possible results, depending on whether Blue or Red wins the next point.
In many examples, it has been the experience of the authors that the calculation of Richman costs may be greatly simpli ed by exploiting symmetry or other special structure of the underlying graph. For example, sometimes symmetry considerations allow one to infer that R(v) must equal 1=2 for certain vertices v. At other times, it is possible to prove that two vertices must have the same Richman cost, or else complementary Richman costs (costs that add to 1). Occasionally, it is possible to express the graph D in terms of simpler graphs via covering maps, composition (Courcelle, 1990) Another approach to the computation of Richman cost functions is to rst try to approximate R(v) by computing R(v; t) for some appropriate choice of t and then to use that approximation to rank the vertices in order of their Richman costs. After all, once the correct ranking of vertices is known, it is an easy matter to compute the Richman costs: simply solve a system of linear equations.
We have used this approach and implemented the algorithm described in Table I to compute the Richman cost of nite directed graphs. At rst glance it does not seem like an algorithm at all, since it might never halt. Surprisingly, it always does. Table I calculates the Richman cost function of a nite directed graph in a nite number of steps.
Theorem 11 The algorithm in
Proof: Our plan is to show that R(v; t) converges to R(v) \quickly", and that two non-equal Richman costs R(v) and R(w) cannot be \too close." Under these conditions, we can set a bound on t beyond which all strict inequalities between Richman costs are already satis ed by their approximations R(v; t), and thus we have v 
Conclusion. The inequalities R(v; t) R(w; t) indicate actual inequalities
between Richman costs R(v) R(w). given in the proof of Theorem 11 be improved?
One idea to calculate Poorman costs is to modify the above algorithm using P(v; t) in place of R(v; t). However, we know of no lower bound for the di erence of distinct Poorman costs. Thus, we cannot prove that this procedure for computing Poorman costs halts in bounded time. It seems possible that the algorithm in Table I actually does run in polynomial time, and computational evidence suggests that it is a good algorithm in practice. One way to prove this would be to nd a better strategy for winning Richman games quickly in the presence of cycles. On the other hand, perhaps the problem is NP-hard, in which case we cannot hope to nd a \quick" winning strategy.
We know that R(v; t) converges to R(v). However, does any sequence R 0 (v; t) obeying equation (3) 
Undirected graphs
The remainder of this section is devoted to our polynomial-time algorithm for computing the Richman cost function of an undirected graph.
We begin by de ning some useful terminology.
A partial Richman cost function (PRCF) on a graph G is a triple (V 0 ; E 0 ; R 0 ) where G 0 = (V 0 ; E 0 ) is a subgraph of G containing the colored vertices v r and v b (not necessarily an induced subgraph) and R 0 is a Richman cost function of the undirected graph G 0 .
Our algorithm generates a sequence of partial Richman cost functions such that R 0 (v) takes on the same value in all of the partial Richman cost functions for which it is de ned. We therefore take the function R 0 for granted and refer to the \PRCF" G 0 .
The slope of an edge vw in any PRCF is the absolute value of R 0 (v)?R 0 (w). is an edge (that is, G is really a graph). Then its Richman cost function can be calculated in polynomial time.
Proof: We construct an increasing sequence of PRCF's, ending with a complete Richman cost function.
We begin with the trivial PRCF (V 0 ; E 0 ) where V 0 = fr; bg and E 0 = ;.
The algorithm then proceeds in stages. At each stage, we nd an (undirected) connecting path v 0 ; : : : ; v n with the largest possible slope s. Without loss of generality, we label the vertices of the path so that R 0 (v 0 ) R 0 (v n ). We now extend R 0 to the path by putting R 0 (v i ) = R 0 (v 0 ) + si:
We write V 00 = V 0 fv 1 ; : : : ; v n?1 g and E 00 = E 0 fe 1 ; : : : ; e n g. (The edges here are taken to be undirected edges. That is, for every directed edge added to E 0 , the reversal of that edge is also added to E 0 .) We need to show that (V 00 ; E 00 ) is a PRCF. We can then put the undirected graph (V 00 ; E 00 ) in place of the undirected graph (V 0 ; E 0 ) until there are no more connecting paths.
Claim: (V 00 ; E 00 ) is a PRCF.
It is easy to see that the Richman rule (2) Thus, we need prove only that s does not exceed the slope of any edge in E 0 . Each of those edges entered the PRCF by being in an earlier connecting path, and it inherited its slope from that path. So, we are really proving that the sequence of slopes of connecting paths occurring in the algorithm is nonincreasing.
We show this in the context of our present notation by showing that the act of going from G 0 to G 00 does not introduce any new connecting paths with slopes greater than s. Indeed suppose that w 0 ; f 0 ; w 1 ; f 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; f m ; w m is a connecting path of (V 00 ; E 00 ) with slope t > s. We assume without loss of generality that R 0 (w 0 ) < R 0 (w m ). We divide into cases, according to the location of w 0 and w m . The slope of this path is a weighted average of t and s, hence larger than s, but it is a connecting path G 0 so we have once again a contradiction.
This establishes that no paths with slopes larger than s are introduced, which guarantees that the sequence of slopes in the algorithm is non-increasing as required.
Completing the algorithm.
If there are no connecting paths for G 0 , then we are almost done. Each unlabeled vertex v is connected via edges not in E 0 to exactly one vertex w of G 0 . (At least one vertex since there must be a path in G to v r or v b . At most one vertex since, were there two, there would be a connecting path between the two vertices.)
We need only set R 0 (v) to R 0 (w). This completes the Richman labeling.
To see that this is a polynomial-time algorithm, note that each stage adds at least one edge to the PRCF and that the main work of each stage can be accomplished by one shortest-path search for each pair of labeled vertices. 2
The vertices in G 0 before the nal step of the algorithm constitute the \in-teresting" part of the graph G. On any vertex outside of G 0 play must pass through a \choke point" w on the way to either v r or v b . Thus, neither player will see any interest in bidding until the vertex w has been reached. 
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Are you seeing red?
Now consider the semi-in nite path indicated by Figure 9 . Clearly, the game heavily favors Blue since there is no way for Red to win. Nonetheless, Red can hope to draw.
Theorem 15 On the semi-in nite path indicated by Figure 9 , there is a unique Richman cost function, namely R(v) = 0 for all v. On the other hand, there are many Poorman cost functions, and at the vertex k there is a non-trivial Poorman interval (0; k=(2k + 2)).
Proof: Since Red can win neither game, r(k) = p(k) = 0 for all k.
Consider the Richman game, and suppose Blue's fraction of the total money supply is > 0 and the token is on the vertex k. Let Blue play as if the vertex n = k were colored red. Since Blue has more than k=n of the total money supply, he can force a win on a nite path of length n and thus a fortiori on the in nite path. Now consider the Poorman game, and suppose Blue has a winning strategy that guarantees a win in at most n moves for some number n. This strategy is then also a winning strategy on the nite path of length n. However, applying l'Hôpital's rule to the right hand side of equation (6), we get lim x!1 x k+1 ? x (x + 1)(x k+1 ? 1) = k 2k + 2 ; so P(k) > k=(2k + 2) on the path of length n. Thus, Blue's share of the money supply must have been more than k=(2k + 2).
Conversely, suppose that Blue's share of the money supply is x > k=(2k+2). Then x > P(k) on some nite path. Since Blue can force a win on this path, he can do so on the in nite path. 2 ?k?3i 3i + k i k 3i + k ; (7) to R(k) = 1 ? r(k).
Proof: Using the equivalence between the spinner game and Richman's game, and taking note of the obvious optimal strategies for Blue and Red, we can see that r(k) is the probability of eventually returning home (from k to ?1) on a random walk of step lengths ?1 and +2. Kemperman (1961) shows that the probability of returning home (from k to ?1) for the rst time on step n is equal to k=n times the probability of being at home on step n (starting from k) assuming that the walk continues forever on Z (not on N).
The only way to return home in n steps is to take i steps right and k + 2i steps left, where n = k + 3i.
Summing over all values of i, we get the desired result. As in the proof of Corollary 5, the symmetry in v b and v r implies that R = 1 ? r. 2
The di erence between R(k) and r(k) indicates how much easier it is to move the token to the right (and draw) than to move the token to the left (and win). Note that equation (7) Figure 10 . Also note that looking at how many terms are needed to pass Red's money supply in the sum in Theorem 16 indicates how quickly Blue can win.
Getting real This substitution is also useful on nite graphs. For example, the substitution of the directed graph in Figure 6 (corresponding to a game of Richman tennis) in the nodes of an appropriate graph gives a larger graph corresponding to a set of Richman tennis or a match of Richman tennis.
As in the example of Figure 8 , Poorman costs may be irrational even on a nite directed graph. However, Poorman costs on a nite directed graph are always algebraic since they constitute an isolated (actually the unique) real solution of a system of polynomial equations with rational coe cients. Algorithm. We must show that steepest connecting paths actually exist, and that union of the connecting paths of nonzero slope form a subgraph G 0 = (V 0 ; E 0 ) such that for all v 6 2 V 0 , the vertices w 2 V connected to v by edges not in E 0 all have the same partial Richman cost.
Suppose that G 0 is a subgraph that does not meet this condition. Then there is some vertex v not in V 0 connected to two vertices u; w of V 0 with R 0 (u) 6 = R 0 (w). Thus, there is a connecting path p from u to w of nonzero slope s. To nd a steepest such path, we need only consider vertices v 0 within distance 1=s of both v r and v b . There are only nitely many such vertices since G is locally nite. Hence, the steepest pathp is well de ned (and gets added to G 0 ).
If p andp share no edges, then the next steepest path again lies in the set S of vertices within distance 1=s from v r and v b . It is this path that is added next to G 0 . Since the set S contains a nite number of edges, an edge of p must eventually be added to G 0 . Hence, every connecting path will eventually have one of its edges added. Any connecting paths remaining from the edges of the original connecting path must be shorter than the complete path. Since connecting paths are of nite length, they can be shortened only a nite number of times.
When no more connecting paths of nonzero slope exist, the algorithm may be completed as in Theorem 12. Uniqueness. Let Consider the Richman costs R 0 . Suppose that some edge w 0 w 1 not in E 0 had slope > s according to R 0 . Without loss of generality, w 0 w 1 is the edge of greatest ascent from w 0 . Then extend this edge to a path of greatest ascent w 0 w 1 w 2 : : : by choosing an edge w 1 w 2 of greatest ascent from w 1 , and an edge w 2 w 3 of greatest ascent from w 2 and so on. Such a path must terminate with v r which is by de nition in V 0 . So let w m be the rst vertex of the path in V 0 . Similarly, construct a path v = w 0 ; w ?1 ; w ?2 ; : : : ; w ?k of steepest descent where w ?k is the rst vertex on the path in V 0 . Each edge in this path has slope at least by equation (2) , hence the path has slope at least > s. However, by de nition, there is no connecting path of slope greater than s.
Thus, there is no edge of slope greater than s outside of E 0 . Hence, v 0 and v n are separated by a path of n edges of slope at most s. Now, R(v n )?R(v 0 ) = ns so the slope of each of the n edge must be exactly s. In such a case, we say that the lower bidder defaults, and the higher bidder is allowed to make all remaining moves for free. The game is still (somewhat) playable until = 2. At that point (maximal taxation), both players must pay the high bid, and the high bidder makes a On the other hand, < 0 does lead to a possible game, better called Doleman, since the low bidder obtains the entire bid of his opponent (as in the Poorman game) plus a government subsidy of (? ) dollars.
Beggarman
The rules of the Richman game and its variants above explicitly forbid negative bids in which one actually begs the opponent to move next (compare Berlekamp, 1996) . Even in a Beggarman variant in which such bids were allowed, there would never be a reason to make a negative bid: since all successor vertices are available to both players, it cannot be preferable to have the opponent move next. That is to say, there is no reason to part with money for the chance that your opponent may carry out through negligence a move that you yourself could perform through astuteness.
Although negative bids are never be needed by optimal Beggars, a bid of zero may be optimal in certain positions, such as v in Figure 12 .
One can imagine yet another variant in which the edges of the directed graph are colored blue and red, with the players restricted to moves where the token is slid along an edge of their own color. In this case, a rule to allow negative bids would certainly in uence the outcome of the game. For example, if the token rested on a vertex from which all red edges lead to v b and all blue edges lead to v r , the players would give anything to force the \privilege" of the next move on their opponent. Some rule would have to be imposed to forbid very negative bids. 
Thief
In Thief, the players bid secretly as usual, then reveal their bids. Both players pay their own bid to the bank. The high bidder moves.
Unlike any of the games studied above, Thief may fail to have deterministic optimal strategies.
Consider the directed graph D depicted in Figure 13 where the token is located on vertex v. Suppose the total money supply is one dollar. Clearly, Red can force a win with over 50 cents, and Blue can force a win with over 66 First suppose that Blue has B < 66 2 3 cents. If he plays the pure strategy x < 33 1 3 , he will lose to the Red strategy of 33 1 3 cents every time. On the other hand, a bid of x 33 1 3 loses to the Red strategy of betting 0 every time. Hence Blue's pure strategies guarantee nothing. On the other hand, every Red pure strategy y 2 0; 1 ? B] loses to Blue's betting y + 1 cents. Hence optimal play in this game involves mixed strategies.
If B = 66 2 3 , the Red nondeterministic strategy of playing 0 and 33 1 3 each with probability 1=2 wins half the time against any Blue strategy; no deterministic strategy guarantees winning at all. Blue can guarantee winning half the time with a deterministic strategy of betting 33 1 3 , so the (classical game-theoretic) value is 1=2.
We demonstrate the solution for the example B = 60 in Table II . It may be seen from the rst chart that if Blue plays the strategies 20 cents and 40 cents in the ratio 1 : 2 his expectation is 1=3. From the second chart we see that Red expects to win 2=3 of the time with the mixed strategy of 0, 20, and 40 cents played each with probability 1=3.
A classical matrix-type game in which the players' strategies are taken from the interval 0; 1] is known as a \game on the unit square" (Owen 1991, Chapter IV). Since we assume money is in nitely divisible, the bet at each vertex Figure 13 may be seen as a game on the unit square as long as the payo function may be calculated. We may do that with Figure 13 , because the optimal moves and the value of the game at w are obvious. In general, such games may not have optimal strategies (even nondeterministic) or values. We do not know if arbitrary Thief games must have optimal strategies and values.
Tradesman
In the Thief game above, as in the Poorman game, all money goes to the bank. Instead we could play a Tradesman game where both bidders pay their bid to the other player. Thus, this game resembles both the Thief game (in that both players pay), and the Richman game (in that no money leaves the system). The bottom line is that the high bidder loses the di erence of the two bids to the low bidder.
Consider the example in Figure 13 . Using reasoning similar to that outlined above, we can see that neither player has a deterministic winning strategy under these rules.
Marksman
As usual in this game, both players write their bids secretly on a card, and the cards are then revealed simultaneously. Suppose Herr Blau writes the number x and Ms. Red writes the number y. If x > y, then Blau is deemed to be the high bidder, and he pays Red x deutsche marks. If x < y, then Red is deemed to be the high bidder, and she pays Blau y U.S. dollars.
Suppose that a bank is available that freely trades 1 U.S. dollar for deutsche marks where is the exchange rate. 
Dullman
This is actually a class of several variants.
The low bidder pays his bid (or else his opponent's bid) to the bank (or else to the high bidder), and the high bidder gets the right to move for free.
The rich get richer and the poor get poorer. There is no incentive of any kind to bid anything less than all of one's resources. Thus, the critical Dullman's cost at every black vertex from which there are paths to both v b and v r is 1=2.
Dull game.
Pseudo-variants
There are also some ways of playing a Richman game on a nite directed graph that look like genuine variants but aren't.
First, one could prevent each player from knowing how much money his or her opponent has. However, as was shown in our earlier article (Lazarus et al. 1996) , this does not a ect the costs of positions, though it does restrict the kind of strategy that a player might have to use in order to cash in on a winning situation when the directed graph D has loops. Second, the bidding procedure could be modi ed in any of a number of ways, so that for instance one player bids rst, then the other player must either top that bid or drop out of the bidding, and so on until one of the players drops out, in which case the other player wins the bid. In this case, too, the governing costs of positions are the Richman costs, and an ideal bid is the one given by Richman's original formula. The only situation in which the details of the bidding protocol \matter" is the critical case; otherwise, the favored player can win simply by initially bidding as in an ordinary Richman game and refusing to bid any higher.
Third, one could decree that the player who makes the higher bid pays the amount of the lower bid to his or her adversary. It might initially seem surprising that the theory that applies under this convention should be the same as the theory for Richman's convention. However, one can readily check that this variation only increases the advantage of the favored player. For, if this player has just made the perfect bid (of size B, say), then the player will pay less money if he or she wins the bid and the player's opponent must still pay B in order to win the bid.
